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Abstract: 
The article aims to reflect on the development and prospects of cross-border 
cooperation between Scotland and England in a European perspective. Over the past 
25 years the EU has supported specific programmes of cooperation across the EU’s 
internal borders (INTERREG), which have allowed thousands of local and regional 
actors to work on common actions, projects or strategies to overcome long-standing 
processes of conflict, competition or lack of cooperation. The paper first discusses 
the added-value and shortcomings of these EU territorial cooperation initiatives, 
before considering recent developments and future options for cooperation across the 
Anglo-Scottish border. In capturing how the drive for local and regional actors 
within the EU to engage in trans-boundary cooperation is shaped by both the a priori 
existence of strong, historically-rooted cross-border relationships and by more 
pragmatic concerns to access new resources and policy ideas, the article goes on to 
examine how such motivations have played out across the Anglo-Scottish border. 
While acknowledging the benefits of trans-boundary co-operation, the article 
provides a more cautious assessment of the various barriers and asymmetries that can 
hinder cross-border co-operation and, in focusing on the area of spatial planning, 
highlights a particular challenge for economic and social collaborations across the 
Anglo-Scottish border. The article ends with a brief reflexion on the implications of 
the results of the 2016 Brexit referendum, before concluding with the most relevant 
lessons from European territorial cooperation initiatives for Anglo-Scottish 
cross-border cooperation. 
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Before the Scottish Independence referendum of September 2014, speculations were 
rife as to what a new international border would concretely mean - if the “Yes” won - 
for the daily life, mobility flows and relationships between the inhabitants and 
economic actors of the regions surrounding the Anglo-Scottish border. After the 
referendum, the question of cross-border relations and cooperation between actors 
located on both sides of the border has not lost its relevance, due to the pre-existing 
legal and institutional differences between England and Scotland, to the impact of 
devolution on policy trajectories in both nations since 1999 (compounded by the 
granting of additional devolved powers to Scotland through the 2016 Scotland Act), 
and to the increasingly divergent political agendas which have emerged since 2010 
out of political change in the Westminster Parliament and in the Scottish Parliament. 
Additionally, the uncertainties created by the results of the United Kingdom (UK) 
European Union membership referendum of 23 June 2016 (“Brexit referendum”), in 
which 52% of UK voters supported the option of leaving the European Union (EU), 
means that the possibility of a second independence referendum in Scotland is not 
entirely off the agenda in the foreseeable future. 
 
This contribution focuses on cross-border cooperation between primarily local and 
regional actors (i.e. sub-central state actors, which in the context of this paper mean 
actors at levels below that of the UK and Scottish governments). It leaves out the 
question of the cooperation between the UK and Scottish parliaments and 
governments to deal with shared ‘national’ problems and resolve disputes through 
inter-governmental coordination (Paun and Munro 2015) – i.e. the challenges of 
‘shared rule’ explored by McEwen and Petersohn (2015). The paper aims to put the 
question of cross-border relations between Scotland and England in a European 
perspective. In 1990 the European Union (EU) created specific programmes (named 
INTERREG) to support new forms of cooperation across the EU’s internal and 
external borders within the wider framework of EU Cohesion (or Regional) Policy. 
25 years after the creation of INTERREG, many local and regional authorities across 
the EU are now routinely involved in forms of cooperation across state borders, often 
(although not always) supported by such EU-funded programmes. In various parts of 
Europe, trans-boundary cooperation has become institutionalised through, for 
example, permanent ‘Euroregions’ or ‘European Groupings of Territorial 
Cooperation’. Such forms of cooperation aim to offer an incentive and a framework 
to overcome long-standing processes of conflict, competition or lack of coordination 
between the actors located on the two sides of a state border. 
 
The generic term ‘trans-boundary’ is used here to refer to ‘(more or less 
institutionalized) forms of collaboration between sub-central authorities from two or 
more states, aimed at the coordination and elaboration of common actions, projects, 
policies or strategies across a national border’ (Colomb et al. forthcoming). Such 
forms of cooperation can occur at different geographical scales, as explained below. 
Several terms have therefore been used by EU policy actors and academics to refer to 
these multiple scales of cooperation – hence the use of the umbrella term 
‘trans-boundary’. The growth and diversification of trans-boundary cooperation 
initiatives in Europe has generated a vast amount of research in geography, regional 
studies, political science, ‘border studies’, planning and sociology, which cannot be 
done justice to in this paper. Instead, this contribution offers a selective reflection on 
the added-value, shortcomings and lessons of EU-funded programmes of 
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trans-boundary cooperation which are of particular relevance for cooperation 
alongside the Anglo-Scottish border.1  
 
 
The EU as a promoter of trans-boundary cooperation 
between local and regional actors 
 
Trans-boundary cooperation in Europe was for a long time within the hands of 
central state actors. In the 1960s and 1970s, to deal with specific cross-border issues 
of regional scale (such as the coordination of transport infrastructure planning), bi- or 
multilateral governmental commissions were established to facilitate inter-state 
cooperation (for example the Benelux, the Nordic Council, or the International 
Commission of the Pyrenees). These were not open to local authorities (Perkmann 
2003), which were not legal subjects according to international law and thus not 
allowed to conclude international agreements with foreign authorities. 
Trans-boundary cooperation between sub-central levels of government was therefore 
based on informal arrangements (ibid.), such as the first ‘Euroregion’ created in 1958 
at the German-Dutch border. The Council of Europe approved the Madrid 
Convention in 1980, which allowed sub-central state actors to enter into formal 
cross-border cooperation agreements.  
 
In the 1980s, the consolidation of the Single European Market was accompanied by 
the parallel development of an EU regional (or cohesion) policy, in order to 
compensate for the inter-regional disparities strengthened by the abolition of internal 
borders and the free movement of goods, people and capital in the European 
Community. In 1990 a small pilot programme was created within that framework, 
named INTERREG, and was expanded in the decades that followed to support 
trans-boundary cooperation across the EU’s internal and external borders. 2 
EU-funded programmes of ‘European Territorial Cooperation’ (as this component of 
EU regional policy is now known) have focused on three levels of scale: 
cross-border cooperation (INTERREG A), currently covering 53 areas immediately 
adjacent to each EU internal border (e.g. within a 50-100 km wide strip); 
transnational cooperation, currently taking the shape of 13 programmes covering 
large groupings of European regions (INTERREG B); and inter-regional 
cooperation, supporting networks and exchanges of good practice between urban and 
regional actors across the whole of the EU (formerly INTERREG C, now known as 
INTERREG Europe). For the 2014-2020 programming period, the total budget for 
European Territorial Cooperation programmes amounted to €10.1 billion, i.e. 2.8% 
of the total budget for EU Cohesion Policy.3 
                                                          
1 The paper is based on the author’s previous professional experience in an INTERREG 
programme IIIB (2002-2004) as well as her past research on policy learning, trans-boundary 
cooperation and spatial planning in North-West Europe and in Catalonia (Spain). 
2 For internal borders, INTERREG is funded by the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) in the framework of EU regional policy. Additionally, cross-border cooperation 
initiatives at the external borders of the EU are co-funded by the Instrument for Pre-Accession 
(IPA) and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI). 
3  For an up-to-date overview of those programmes see the European Commission’s DG 
REGIO web page: 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/.  
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From the European Commission’s point of view, European Territorial Cooperation 
programmes are supposed to help overcome ‘border effects’ and achieve the EU 
objectives of economic, social and territorial cohesion by encouraging local and 
regional authorities, social and economic actors to address territorial development 
and spatial planning problems across state borders more effectively. It has also been 
argued that the European Commission sees trans-boundary networking as a way to 
promote particular policy agendas and ‘good practices’ in fields where the EU does 
not have a formal legislative competence (Bomberg and Peterson 2000), such as 
spatial planning and urban policy (Atkinson 2001; Dühr et al. 2010).  
 
The EU has therefore given a significant financial and technical impulse to the 
development of new projects and practices of trans-boundary cooperation. 
Independently from EU-funded programmes, there exists other forms of 
trans-boundary cooperation between sub-central governmental actors in the EU, e.g. 
inter-city networks or ‘Eurometropolises’, such as the Lille-Kortrijk-Tournai 
Eurometropolis created in 2008 which brings together 147 French and Belgian 
municipalities, as well as all French and Belgian governmental levels represented by 
14 institutions, to work together to remove the border effect and make daily life 
easier for its 2.1 million inhabitants.4  
 
This has produced a complex mosaic of different scales and forms of trans-boundary 
cooperation in Europe, from generic, wide-ranging initiatives covering a particular 
cross-border territory (small or large), to sectorial or thematic networks covering a 
wide range of policy fields. Such initiatives – which are more or less institutionalised 
and stable over time - involve a diverse range of actors (regional and local 
authorities, economic development agencies, business associations, chambers of 
commerce, universities, NGOs, and less often, private firms). Perkmann (2003) and 
Oliveras González et al. (2010) carried out a review of cross-border regional 
cooperation initiatives in the EU, defined as initiatives whose main protagonists are 
public sub-central governmental authorities in different countries, concerned with 
practical problem-solving in a broad range of fields of everyday administrative life, 
and which involve a certain stabilization of cross-border contacts, i.e. 
institution-building, over time (Perkmann 2003, 156). In the mid-1980s there were 
only 20 such initiatives, which increased to 73 by 2003 (Perkmann 2003) and to 133 
by 2007 (Oliveras González et al. 2010), under various labels such as ‘Euroregions’, 
‘Eurodistricts’ or ‘Working Communities’.  
 
The increasingly proactive engagement of sub-central state actors in trans-boundary 
cooperation initiatives goes hand in hand with the strengthening of the role of 
municipal and regional authorities in Europe (in part thanks to devolution and 
decentralisation processes), and their transformation into key political actors and 
agents of local and regional development (Le Galès 2002; Pike et al. forthcoming). 
Looking at the geography of trans-boundary cooperation initiatives in Europe, one 
may assume that the most intensive forms of cooperation are based on the a priori 
existence of strong, historically-rooted cross-border functional, cultural and 
linguistic relationships inherited from a (distant) shared past (Perkmann 2003; 
Colomb et al. forthcoming). Indeed INTERREG programmes have funded a plethora 
                                                          
4 See http://www.eurometropolis.eu/?noRedirect=1.  
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of projects aiming to recover, revive or celebrate various expressions of cross-border 
heritage, history and culture. 
 
But this is not always the case. More often than not, the drive for local and regional 
actors to engage in trans-boundary cooperation is highly pragmatic. Engaging in 
trans-boundary cooperation offers access to EU funding, to knowledge, policy ideas 
and experiences from other parts of Europe, as well as the possibility to solve 
specific cross-border issues through the coordination and/or rescaling of policy 
responses. Trans-boundary cooperation activities represent the will to overcome, at 
the local or regional level, the practical consequences and negative externalities of 
the continuous existence of national borders, which remain markers of differences in 
legal and administrative systems, health provision, education, labour market 
regulations, transport, spatial planning etc. The existence of dedicated EU 
programmes of territorial cooperation, of associated funding and technical expertise, 
and/or of legal structures and tools facilitating cooperation, means that there is an 
additional incentive for local and regional actors to focus on the issues ‘that unite, 
such as common problems and/or assets, economic linkages and a shared cultural 
identity’, rather than the ‘issues that divide, such as inter-territorial economic 
competition, rival claims to resources and variations in political “voice”’ (Pike 2002, 
1079). 
 
Trans-boundary cooperation projects and programmes are thus an important element 
in the social construction of cross-border regions, albeit not the only one. Oliveras 
González (2013), building on the social constructivist approach to (cross-border) 
‘region-ness’ proposed by Perkmann (2003) and others (e.g. Paasi 1986, 2010; 
Gualini 2003), conceptualizes a cross-border region as the result of a process in 
which some, or all, of the following elements converge: a) a territory divided by a 
political border, but where similar territorial processes take place; b) some 
cross-border social, economic and/or environmental dynamics; c) some interrelated 
territorial agents who mobilize to implement projects of mutual interest; d) some 
projects carried out through cooperation; e) a common identity, based on the same 
culture, language, symbology, history or shared territory; and f) discourses and 
narratives (of geographical, historical, socio-economic and/or socio-cultural unity) 
that project the idea of sharing the territory, certain dynamics, projects and/or an 
identity.  
 
In the border regions which are ‘peripheral’ in geographical, demographic and 
economic terms in relation to the metropolitan centres of growth and population of 
their national territory, involvement in cross-border projects and strategic initiatives 
can give them more visibility in the eyes of external actors (higher levels of 
government or potential investors), counteract dominant national narratives from the 
‘centre’, and build a critical mass for new services or infrastructure in less populated 
regions. The case of the Cerdanya, a mountainous valley of 1,300 km2 at the border 
between France and Spain (Catalonia), illustrates this (Colomb et al. 2016). Since the 
1980s, various forms of ‘micro-level’ cross-border cooperation have emerged 
between the municipalities and intermediate levels of government on both sides of 
the border. They have been driven by several motivations: solve conflicts about the 
management of natural resources (e.g. water); support economic development and 
common sectors (e.g. agriculture); reach a critical mass of population to attract 
supra-municipal infrastructure (e.g. a new cross-border slaughterhouse and hospital); 
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and jointly manage natural risks (e.g. forest fires) (Oliveras González 2013). These 
practical considerations have sometimes been accompanied by a discourse on 
(cross-border) Catalan cultural unity and identity, more often invoked by Catalan 
actors south of the border (Ibid.). The flagship project of Franco-Catalan 
cross-border cooperation has been the construction of the first European cross-border 
hospital - the Hospital of the Cerdanya opened in September 2014 in Puigcerdà, 1 
kilometre south of the border. It provides care for a permanent population of 32,000 
(which can quadruple during the winter and summer holidays) spread over 53 
municipalities on both sides of the border. The planning, construction and 
management of the hospital have proven to be very complex, because of the number 
of actors and issues involved, and of a notable asymmetry of competences: in France, 
health care facilities are within the remit of the national Ministry of Health and its 
regional agencies; in Spain, of the Autonomous Communities (i.e. the Catalan 
government in this instance).  
 
In some border territories, a degree of political symbolism may also be attached to 
cross-border cooperation. In regions governed by parties or coalitions with a strong 
regionalist or autonomist agenda (such as Catalonia or the Basque Country), 
trans-boundary cooperation has often been mobilized by local and regional 
governmental actors as a form of regional ‘para-diplomacy’ (Trillo Santamaría and 
Lois González 2014) to support political, economic and cultural goals broadly 
conceived,. The engagement of public actors in trans-boundary cooperation can be 
part of a broader strategy of mobilizing the ‘territorial imaginary’ in discourses on 
regional affirmation (Colomb et al. forthcoming) and creating new spaces of 
discursive ‘cross-border regionalist engagement’ (García-Álvarez and 
Trillo-Santamaría 2013). In such cases, there has been a convergence between what 
Prytherch (2009) calls - with reference to the Catalan and Valencian case - the ‘new’ 
politics of economic, transborder macroregionalism or Euroregionalism, and the 
‘old’ politics of cultural regionalism and nationalism. The engagement of Catalan 
regional actors in trans-boundary cooperation (in particular in the Euroregion 
Pyrenees-Mediterranean) has been part of the search for a strengthened political and 
economic role for Catalonia in the South-Western Mediterranean and in Europe, in 
the context of recurrent tensions with the Spanish central state over claims for more 
regional autonomy (Colomb et al. forthcoming). 
 
 
The added-value and shortcomings of trans-boundary 
cooperation in the EU 
 
In the framework of EU-funded INTERREG programmes, thousands of 
trans-boundary cooperation projects have been developed on an ad hoc basis, 
co-funded by the European Regional Development Funds. Their life span is often 
limited to the few years of the funding period, and partnerships do not always 
survive beyond that. In some cases, projects have led to, or fed into, more stable or 
institutionalized forms of cooperation. Altogether, however, evaluating the outcomes 
and territorial impacts of past EU-funded territorial cooperation programmes and 
projects is a challenging task (Colomb 2007). The ‘added-value’ of INTERREG 
projects lies in tangible and intangible outcomes, many of which are difficult to 
‘quantify’: awareness-raising, extended networks, confidence and trust building, 
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knowledge transfer, capacity building, development of new ideas and solutions, 
commitment to new actions or cost savings (INTERACT 2013). Evidence from 
previous INTERREG programmes and projects shows that trans-boundary 
cooperation has facilitated the diffusion of certain policy ideas (such as sustainable 
development or integrated urban regeneration) across European cities and regions, 
and sometimes led to changes in urban, regional and spatial planning approaches or 
to innovation in territorial governance (see for example Janin Rivolin and Faludi 
2005; Pedrazzini 2005; ESPON and Nordregio 2005; Hachmann 2011). They have 
also led to concrete, localized improvements in services in cross-border areas - albeit 
limited, as INTERREG funding does not finance large-scale infrastructure (unlike 
the mainstream EU Structural Funds). 
 
The EU Commission’s Directorate-General for Regional Policy commissioned a 
‘Cross-Border Review’ in 2015 to carry out an inventory of the critical border 
obstacles which remain 25 years after the creation of INTERREG. It noted that 
INTERREG played an important role in ‘alleviating border obstacles and enhancing 
a spirit of cooperation’, but that many of these obstacles ‘call for changes in laws 
and/or administrative procedures’ (CEC 2015, np) whose roots may not lie at the 
local or regional level, and are therefore beyond the remit of INTERREG 
programmes: 
Crossing borders to find employment, receive better healthcare, make use of 
public facilities or receive emergency support can still cause difficulties. 
Taxation or pension rights issues, non-recognition of rights or standards, 
impossibility to operate joint emergency services are still problems that exist 
today. Most of the remaining obstacles stem from diverging national 
legislations on either side of the border…, incompatible administrative 
processes, or simply lack of common territorial planning (Ibid.). 
 
Trans-boundary cooperation may become institutionalized through the formation of 
permanent structures which take various forms in legal and organizational terms, 
bringing together local or regional authorities or other actors from both sides of a 
border. This represents a process of ‘solidification’, whereby ‘soft’ spaces of 
trans-boundary cooperation ‘are transfigured into harder, more clearly regulated and 
governed, spaces through the establishment of more rigid and strictly formatted and 
regulated socio-material forms of spatial organization’ (Metzger and Schmitt 2012, 
266). Such structures emerge thanks to political will and agreements between the 
leaders of their member institutions, e.g. regional governments in the case of 
Euroregions. They usually entail a small amount of dedicated human, administrative 
and financial resources, and offer an arena for the development and implementation 
of concrete cross-border projects, often with EU funding. In the EU, this process has 
been facilitated by the creation in 2006 of a new juridical figure, the European 
Groupings of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC), which enables regional and local 
authorities from different EU member states to cooperate more effectively.5 Yet the 
existence of a formalized trans-boundary structure does not guarantee the actual 
success of cooperation, which relies instead on the proactive engagement of specific 
‘policy entrepreneurs’ (Perkmann 2007b) and networks of public and private actors 
who are willing to drive concrete projects. In the Euroregion Pyrenees 
                                                          
5  See the EGTC portal at: https://portal.cor.europa.eu/egtc/Pages/welcome.aspx for more 
information. 
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Mediterranean, for example, the development of trans-boundary cooperation projects 
in the fields of culture, higher education, sustainable development, renewable energy, 
bio- and other high technologies have been supported by a small dedicated team and 
by Euroregional grants funded from a ‘common pot’ created by the four participating 
regional governments. Many of these projects, however, were built upon pre-existing 
functional networks and initiatives which were already in place between key actors 
on both sides of the Franco-Catalan border: universities, the 40 chambers of 
commerce of the Euroregional territory, trade unions, port authorities, professional 
associations from the tourism or agriculture sectors, and cultural institutions (Morata 
and Noferini 2013). This demonstrates how cross-border cooperation initiatives 
might come from the bottom-up, driven by the demands of the ‘borderlanders’ 
themselves: citizens, businesses, and other civil society actors. 
 
Some scholars have described such formalized structures as ‘producing another soft, 
but institutionalized, comprehensive, stable and territorially-defined layer in the 
European “multi-level-system” [of governance]’ (Blatter 2004, 350; Perkmann 
2007a). Others have been more cautious about the long-term structural impacts of 
such forms of cooperation (Dühr and Nadin 2007). Dühr et al. (2010, Ch. 22) have 
conceptualised the potential changes in spatial planning and territorial development 
policies which can arise from the participation of local and regional actors in 
trans-boundary cooperation into three types: (localized) policy learning and policy 
change; a trans-boundary rescaling of policies; and policy convergence between the 
participating institutions. Past research on North-West Europe showed that there is, 
in some cases, evidence of policy learning and policy change at the local or regional 
level as a result of trans-boundary cooperation. However, there is no evidence of a 
long-term rescaling of spatial planning, territorial development strategies at the 
cross-border or transnational scale, or of a convergence of planning systems and 
territorial development practices (Dühr and Nadin 2007; Dühr et al. 2010, Ch. 23; 
Stead 2013). In the Catalan case, multiple forms of trans-boundary cooperation have 
led to new spaces of discursive ‘cross-border regionalist engagement’ 
(García-Álvarez and Trillo-Santamaría 2013), and in some cases to new spaces of 
‘soft planning’ and small-scale innovation addressing specific territorial 
development issues (e.g. water management or health service provision). But they 
have not led to a durable and comprehensive trans-boundary rescaling or 
transformation of ‘hard’, statutorily defined planning spaces and strategies, nor to a 
change in territorial governance paradigms which would fundamentally reshape the 
existing division of competences between tiers of governments (Colomb et al. 
forthcoming). 
 
This more cautious assessment has been drawn from a close look at the various 
factors which influence trans-boundary cooperation activities - and potentially 
facilitate or on the contrary, constrain, the individual, intra-organisational and 
inter-organisational working and learning processes which occur (Colomb 2007). 
There are technical and political difficulties involved in the development of 
institutionalized forms of cooperation that go beyond a logic of ad hoc projects. 
Within organisations, engagement in trans-boundary cooperation is conditioned by 
the presence of proactive leaders and political will to transcend competition and old 
rivalries. This can be affected by the vagaries of electoral politics in local and 
regional authorities. Additionally, even when political will is present, trans-boundary 
working poses specific challenges in terms of institutional capacity, such as the 
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presence of adequate human, financial and technical resources; or the existence of 
good relationships with other tiers of government and socio-economic actors. 
Following the 2008 recession, public expenditure cuts have severely affected many 
local and regional governments across Europe, which means that investing (scarce) 
resources in trans-boundary cooperation projects can be perceived as an unnecessary 
luxury, not as a priority.  
 
Between organisations, the differences and asymmetries in competences, powers and 
funding sources between local and regional authorities on each side of a border are 
key factors influencing possible trans-boundary cooperation, in addition to 
differences in institutional capacity (e.g. the presence of dedicated officers with 
technical expertise in EU project management or adequate language skills). 
Moreover, many European trans-boundary cooperation projects have so far been led 
by local or regional public authorities, with variable, but generally lower, degrees of 
participation by civil society organizations and private sector businesses. There is 
often a gap between institutional cross-border activities and people’s knowledge of, 
and interest in them. The national and regional media often barely report on 
cross-border issues and initiatives. In some parts of Europe, the mental maps of the 
residents of each side of the border are still very bounded by national spaces, and a 
degree of indifference to what is happening on the other side of the border prevails 
(Ernste 2010), in spite of occasional cross-border mobility practices. Several studies 
in various European border regions have shown that the emergence of cross-border 
regional identities among the ‘borderlanders’ is slow or weak (inter alia Paasi 1996; 
Wilson and Donnan 1998; Kaplan 2000; Häkli 2001; Kaplan and Häkli 2002; Häkli 
2004). Additionally, cross-border labour mobility is very low in the EU (van Houtum 
and van Der Velde 2004; Recchi 2008; van der Velden and van Naerssen 2011; Mau 
and Mewes 2012). 
 
 
Prospects for cooperation alongside the Anglo-Scottish 
border 
 
Prior to Scotland’s Independence Referendum, the reactions generated by the 
possibility of Scottish independence in the North East of England and Cumbria were 
characterised by a mix of anxiety, envy, regret and hope (Shaw 2014). Some political 
and business leaders from the North of England have, before and after September 
2014, feared that a stronger Scotland would pose a threat to economic development 
south of the border (Shaw et al. 2014). Nonetheless, as outlined in the Introduction to 
this special issue, there is also a widespread sense both in the North of England and 
in Scotland that a more powerful Scotland also represents an opportunity for the 
territories south of the border, and that new areas of potential cooperation and 
partnerships on matters of mutual interest should be explored. There is a clear sense 
of the common bond that exists between the North East, Cumbria and Scotland 
among many political actors and residents of the border area: 
This is not just a product of geography, including the daily cross-border flows 
of people for work, shopping or family visits, but also reflects shared 
experiences of economic and industrial change and what some have seen as a 
common commitment to economic and social justice. There is also a strong 
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shared sense of being on the periphery: a long way from the centre of 
economic and political power in London. (Shaw 2014, 397) 
 
The seeds of cross-border cooperation were sown in the early 2000s, with the 
creation in 2002 of a ‘Border Visions initiative’ which brought together the county 
councils of Cumbria and Northumberland and the Scottish regional councils of 
Borders and Dumfries and Galloway to discuss common issues and challenges at an 
annual conference. The initiative identified a list of sectors for collaborative 
working, but fell short of bringing about concrete projects.  
 
Prior to September 2014, the pre-referendum climate gave rise to cross-border 
contacts and initiatives which have been sustained after the vote (Shaw 2014, 2015). 
The Association of North East Councils (ANEC), with the support of Cumbria 
County Council, commissioned a study entitled ‘Borderlands: can the North East 
and Cumbria benefit from greater Scottish autonomy?’ (Shaw et al. 2013). The 
Borderlands study analysed the views of various stakeholders in the cross-border 
territories covered, reviewed previous cooperation attempts, and listed a number of 
sectors, themes and issues on which Scottish and Northern English local authorities, 
Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) and other institutions could cooperate. The first 
step in successful cross-border cooperation often entails the generation of ‘a shared 
understanding and intellectual framing of the context, issues and challenges faced’ 
across the border (Peel and Lloyd 2015, 2213 based on Scott 1999). The Borderlands 
report has played a key role in that framing process, and its recommendations 
successfully attracted political support from both sides of the border (the First 
Minister of Scotland, the Scottish Government’s Local Government Minister, and 
key actors in the North of England). 
 
The report’s final recommendations included proposals to commission a detailed 
analysis of existing cross-border linkages (i.e. travel to work, shop, and leisure flows, 
labour markets, migration, inward investment and sectoral linkages);6 to convene an 
Annual Economic Summit between key public and private stakeholders from 
Scotland, the North East and Cumbria; to facilitate sector-based working groups 
covering specific areas of the economy that have strong cross-border interests; and to 
develop a ‘Borderlands Partnership’ to identify common economic challenges and 
opportunities across the five local authorities on both sides of the border. The 
report’s publication led to the launch of the Borderlands Initiative in August 2013, 
which brings together the councils of Northumberland, Cumbria, Dumfries and 
Galloway, the Scottish Borders, and the city of Carlisle, with backing from the 
Scottish Government (Carrell 2013).7 The first Borderlands Initiative summit took 
place in April 2014, and the five partners have begun to think about collaborations in 
the fields of transport, tourism, forestry, energy and renewables (see Peck, this 
issue).8 The Borderlands Initiative, however, has not yet published a comprehensive 
strategy or plan.  
                                                          
6  A good example of such a study, funded by INTERREG, is the Cross-Channel Atlas 
http://atlas-transmanche.certic.unicaen.fr/en/ (France-England). 
7 to date without participation of the city councils of Newcastle, Sunderland and 
Middlesborough. 
8 In the aftermath of the independence referendum, the House of Commons Scottish Affairs 
Committee carried out an inquiry on ‘Our Borderlands, Our Future’, from the perspective of 
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The authors of the Borderlands report advocated cross-border cooperation as ‘an 
opportunity to rescale or recalibrate traditional spatial approaches to place-based 
economic development’ (Shaw et al. 2014, 416) and engage in a form of 
‘co-optition’, where competitors agree to work together with each other on a 
project-to-project, joint venture or co-marketing basis (Ibid., 414). This involves: 
joint approaches to economic development in a number of key sectors; joint 
approaches across a range of sectors based on relevant geographical areas, policy 
co-ordination; and development of a common ‘voice’ and capacity to influence 
(Shaw et al. 2013). The type of policy issues, topics or economic sectors mentioned 
in the Borderlands report as possible foci of cooperation are similar to those often 
covered by EU-funded cross-border cooperation projects and programmes, in 
particular in relatively rural border regions which have long been perceived as 
‘peripheral’ in their respective nations: transport infrastructure and services 
(motorway improvements, high speed rail between Edinburgh and Newcastle, 
connections to port and airport facilities, connectivity of rural bus services, walking 
and cycling paths); tourism (joint marketing of the Borderlands); 
telecommunications (superfast broadband); energy (renewables, offshore wind, 
North sea oil and gas); agriculture, food and forestry; education, skills and training; 
and business development and support to SMEs. 
 
Within this broad range of sectors, some topics lend themselves to cooperation more 
easily than others, because of the presence of what Häkli calls a ‘boundary object’: a 
linking interface between two systems, a ‘more-than-human actor’ (such as a natural 
element or ecosystem) which people refer to as a point of reference in their 
interaction and which plays a trust-building function to bridge ‘communities of 
practice’, for example a flooding river: 
Successful cross border cooperation depends on trust-building boundary 
objects that help in negotiating and resolving potentially conflicting sets of 
concerns that arise from the intersection of the multiple communities of 
practice involved (Häkli 2009, 210).  
 
One particular policy field which was not elaborated upon in the Borderlands report, 
but for which cross-border cooperation appears crucial, is that of spatial planning. 
Planning entails the regulation and control of land uses and development, the spatial 
distribution of infrastructure and public amenities, and the protection of specific 
areas of natural, environmental or historical value. The devolution processes set into 
motion in the late 1990s, as well as political changes in the Westminster and 
devolved parliaments after 2010, have compounded the divergence between the 
planning systems and policies of the four nations of the UK. The extent to which 
devolution has led to distinctive or divergent policy choices between devolved 
governments and to more diversity in territorial management strategies is subject to 
debates in political science (Keating 2005, 2013; Keating et al. 2009). There is 
evidence to suggest that in the field of spatial planning, devolution has nurtured the 
emergence of new sub-national planning spaces and generated a variety of ‘spatial 
plannings’ between and within the nations of the UK (Haughton et al. 2010). 
                                                                                                                                         
the Scottish side of the border (House of Commons 2015). The committee gave full support to 
the Borderlands Initiative. 
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Scotland has always had a separate planning system different from that of England 
and Wales. Since 1999 planning is a matter devolved to the Scottish Parliament, and 
in 2006 new Scottish planning legislation was enacted. This prompted debates about 
the distinctiveness of Scottish planning, often described as more interventionist, 
more pluralistic and corporatist in its policy-making style (Lloyd and Peel 2009).  
 
Since 2010, the four governments of the UK, Wales, Northern Ireland and Scotland 
all have a different political composition. The UK government has since 2010 been 
led by the Conservative Party (between 2010-2015 in a coalition with the Liberal 
Democrats) which dismantled many elements of the strategic planning reforms 
enacted by the previous New Labour governments (1997-2010). The Conservatives 
abolished English Regional Development Agencies (replaced by new, non-statutory 
Local Enterprise Partnerships) and Regional Planning Strategies, as well as previous 
urban regeneration programmes, and facilitated a pro-development relaxation of 
planning policies. The 2011 Localism Act introduced a new tier of ‘Neighbourhood 
Planning’ giving the option to residents to prepare a plan for a designed area. This 
‘downscaling’ of planning has been criticized for undermining the state’s ability to 
achieve broader and longer term spatial objectives (Baker and Wong 2013; Boddy 
and Hickman 2013; Gallent et al. 2013; Rozee 2014; Colomb and Tomaney 2015), in 
spite of the formal ‘Duty to Cooperate’ which requires English local authorities to 
work with neighbouring authorities in the preparation of their development plans.  
 
The electoral victory of the Scottish National Party (SNP, generally described as a 
centre-left/social-democratic party) in the 2011 and 2016 Scottish Parliamentary 
Elections strengthened the divergence between the planning policy agendas of the 
Scottish and UK Governments. While UK Conservative leaders have embraced an 
‘anti-planning rhetoric’ painting planners as ‘enemies of enterprise’ responsible for 
housing shortages (in particular in the South of England), in Scotland there is 
evidence of a stronger consensus ‘about the value of proactive spatial planning, 
which chimes with what are widely perceived to be distinctive Scottish values about 
the role of the state in securing equitable social and economic outcomes’ (Tomaney 
and Colomb 2013, 373).  
 
In the run-up to the Scottish Independence referendum, spatial planning had acquired 
an important role in the SNP’s agenda, partly ‘because key levers necessary to 
achieve its programmatic objectives, such as taxation and energy policy, remain 
reserved powers, but partly also because the strategic, visionary element of planning 
is seen as supporting its vision for an independent Scotland’ (Ibid.). The 3rd National 
Planning Framework (NPF) for Scotland (Scottish Government 2014), which was 
published just before the referendum, includes a positive vision for the territory of 
Scotland and contrasts with the lack of any similar spatial vision for England (even 
under previous UK Labour governments). Distinctive policy agendas and reforms 
have also been pushed forward by the SNP government in the aftermath of the 
referendum - for example in the fields of energy policy (including a ban on fracking 
for shale gas), land reform, and the Community Empowerment Bill passed in June 
2015 - which are ideologically very far from the UK Conservative Party’s agenda. 
 
What this means for local and regional authorities at the Anglo-Scottish border is an 
increased need for cooperation or coordination on planning issues, both at a small 
scale (e.g. an extension of the ‘Duty to Cooperate’ of the Localism Act to include, de 
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facto, Scottish local authorities and ensure that there is no blatant contradiction and 
conflicts between the key policy aims and proposals of binding planning documents 
on both sides of the border), and at a wider regional or national scale (e.g. on issues 
of transport infrastructure or energy networks). One could also support the 
development of a non-statutory spatial vision for the Borderlands, reflecting the 
emergence of ‘soft planning spaces’ with ‘fuzzy boundaries’ (Allmendinger and 
Haughton 2009; Haughton et al. 2010), which would help overcome insular or 
‘back-to-back planning’ (Peel and Lloyd 2015). Inspiration can be sought from 
long-standing experiments in cross-border spatial visioning in Europe (Dühr 2007) 
(e.g. in the Benelux area) or, more recently, from the bilateral spatial planning 
framework for joint working agreed between the two jurisdictions on the island of 
Ireland (the Framework for Cooperation for the Spatial Strategies of Northern 
Ireland and the Republic of Ireland published in 2013) (Peel and Lloyd 2015).  
 
Other sources of inspiration are to be found in the mechanisms in place in federal 
countries to encourage cooperation on spatial planning issues between the individual 
states/regions (e.g. the Länder in Germany). In that regard, ‘negative’ lessons can 
also be learned from specific European experiences. In the Belgian case - where 
planning is entirely devolved to the regional governments of Flanders, Wallonia and 
the Brussels Capital Region - there has been a lack of cooperation and coordination 
between the three regions on spatial planning issues. Planning has in some instances 
even become a means of strengthening the cultural and political boundaries between 
them (Tomaney and Colomb 2014), as exemplified by the disputes between Flanders 
and the Brussels Capital Region (Boussauw et al. 2013).  
 
 
The challenges of Anglo-Scottish cross-border cooperation 
after the Brexit referendum of June 2016 
 
In the current framework of EU Cohesion (Regional) Policy, the UK territory is 
integrated into several European territorial cooperation programmes (four 
cross-border cooperation programmes, four transnational programmes and one 
pan-European programme) which give Scottish and Northern English local and 
regional actors the opportunity to participate in EU-funded projects with partners 
from other countries. The Western part of Scotland is part of the INTERREG A 
Programme for Northern Ireland, the Border Region of Ireland and Western 
Scotland.9 Different parts of Scotland are additionally included in four INTERREG 
B programmes of transnational cooperation at a broad scale (North-West Europe, 
Atlantic Area, North Sea and Northern Periphery). In that context, Scottish and 
English actors can already work with other EU member states’ partners, if they so 
wish, to apply for ERDF co-financing for cooperation projects at a broad 
transnational scale. Scottish actors have, for example, engaged in several projects 
with their counterparts from Nordic countries (Böhme et al. 2003). 
 
                                                          
9  See 
http://www.seupb.eu/2014-2020Programmes/INTERREGV_Programme/INTERREGV_Over
view.aspx and Taillon’s contribution in this special issue. 
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The outcome of the referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU in June 2016 has 
created considerable uncertainties for the evolving relationship between Scotland and 
the North East of England (Shaw 2016). The referendum was held as a UK-wide 
vote, with no separate requirements for majorities in each of the four constituent 
nations of the UK. The results revealed a highly divided UK: Scotland, Northern 
Ireland and London voted in favour of remaining; England and Wales voted to leave. 
The North East of England had the second highest leave vote of any English region 
(58%). By contrast, 62% of Scottish voters voted to remain.  
 
Those results are likely to have a strong impact on the relationships between the four 
nations of the UK and might possibly lead to its collapse.10 In the aftermath of the 
Brexit referendum, Scotland’s first minister Nicola Sturgeon made it clear that its 
outcome can be regarded as a “material change of circumstance” which would justify 
calling for a second referendum on Scottish independence, “if it is in the best 
interests of Scotland”. She has however taken a cautious approach and pledged to 
consider various options to allow the Scots to remain in the EU (such as the 
possibility of differentiated future relationships between the four nations of the UK 
and the EU). If the UK government proceeds with Brexit (a process which at the 
time of finalizing this paper - August 2016 - was still uncertain), the complexity of 
the existing devolution arrangements within the UK will complicate the process of 
withdrawal from the EU (Hazell and Renwick 2016). The leaders of Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland have demanded a direct involvement in the Brexit negotiations 
and discussed the possibility of the devolved parliaments being given the right to 
vote on the terms of Brexit. 
 
Within England, it has been pointed out that the most ‘Eurosceptic’ English counties  
in the north, Midlands and Cornwall are also the ones that stand to lose most from 
Brexit, as they are large recipients of EU funds and often far more reliant on exports 
to the single market (Hetherington 2016; Springford et al. 2016). The EU referendum 
results have additionally revealed the severity of the crisis faced by Labourism in the 
North of England (Tomaney 2016) and generated uncertainty over the future of the 
English “devolution deals” and “Northern Powerhouse” agenda, with the political 
demise of their advocate George Osborne. Some commentators have consequently 
noted that ‘the prospect of an emboldened and empowered North East – ready to talk 
to Scotland on a more equal basis’ has receded after the [Brexit] referendum result’ 
(Shaw 2016, np). 
 
In the long term, an effective Brexit could somewhat increase scope for policy 
differentiation between the UK nations once their governments have been freed from 
the constraints of EU harmonisation (Hazell and Renwick 2016). The likelihood of 
different tax or even currency regimes would make it harder for cross-border 
economic linkages and activities. But most crucially, the possibility of an 
independent Scotland negotiating to remain within the EU while the rest of the UK is 
out of it would mean the creation of a ‘hard’ border11, ‘a major blow to those on both 
                                                          
10  This has led to fresh calls for radical constitutional change to save the UK from 
disintegration, such as the case made by the all-party Constitution Reform Group (see 
http://www.constitutionreformgroup.co.uk/). 
11 If the UK (and Scotland within it) leaves the EU, it will no longer be part of European 
Territorial Cooperation programmes funded by EU regional policy. The UK borders will 
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sides of the border who had hoped that common EU membership would be one of 
the platforms on which a new cross-border relationship could be developed’ (Shaw 
2016, np). 
 
 
Conclusion: lessons from European territorial cooperation 
programmes for Anglo-Scottish cross-border cooperation 
 
As discussed above, the political will and appetite of key actors from both sides of 
the Anglo-Scottish border for increased cooperation has grown in recent years. 
Whether the Borderlands Initiative will go beyond regular meetings and declarations 
of intent, and deliver concrete outcomes and improvements for the life of borderers 
remains to be seen over time, especially given the uncertainties generated by the 
outcome of the Brexit referendum. The main challenges and hurdles to be overcome 
are not significantly different from those observed in the European territorial 
cooperation projects and programmes referred to in the earlier sections of this paper. 
The experience of 25 years of European territorial cooperation programmes can thus 
generate important lessons for cooperation on the Anglo-Scottish border. 
 
The first one is that the asymmetry of competences between sub-central 
governmental levels across the two sides of a border can hinder trans-boundary 
cooperation processes. This issue is particularly salient across the Anglo-Scottish 
border. While the Scottish government has competences in many (although not all) 
fields which directly shape the spatial organization of the Scottish territory (e.g. rural 
development, internal transport, local government, housing, environment, tourism, 
economic development, spatial planning), this is not the case for the North of 
England, especially after the abolition of regional forms of economic governance and 
spatial planning in England. There is a strong gap between the North of England and 
Scotland in terms of the institutional levers and funding available for economic 
development, which will widen in the near future following the further devolution of 
powers to the Scottish government and if nothing changes in England (Schmuecker 
et al. 2012). Moreover,  
Scotland has a more effective institutional framework, not least because it has 
one focal point: key organisations such as the Scottish Local Authorities, 
                                                                                                                                         
become an ‘external’ EU border and could potentially be covered by some of the EU funding 
programmes targeting cooperation with ‘third countries’ - see 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/cooperation/european-territorial/outside-the-eu/. 
It may be the case that UK actors can still participate in INTERREG projects if the UK 
government match-funds their participation to replace EU funding (as is currently the case 
with Swiss partners who can apply for funds from the Swiss national government to 
participate in INTERREG projects). If the UK leaves the EU and if Scotland becomes an 
independent state within the EU, the Anglo-Scottish border would become an ‘external’ EU 
border, subject to the previous provisions. Moreover, Scottish actors would remain eligible for 
European Territorial Cooperation programmes to cooperate with other EU partners (unlike 
their English counterparts). If the UK remains in the EU, and if Scotland later becomes 
independent and remains in the EU, the Anglo-Scottish border would become a border 
between two EU member states and therefore be eligible for a new EU-funded INTERREG A 
cross-border cooperation programme. 
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Scottish Enterprise, Visit Scotland, the Scottish Funding Council and Skills 
Scotland all speak directly to the First Minister and colleagues on a regular 
basis. There is obviously an institutional mismatch. (Shaw et al. 2013, 36) 
 
There may consequently be significant asymmetries in the scale and type of actors 
who need to cooperate on particular issues, with potential difficulties in getting 
high-ranking Scottish government officials to sit with English local government 
officers. The above mentioned House of Commons report (2015) stressed that due to 
the limited competences and/or funding available to local and regional actors, 
political support from both the UK and Scottish Governments is vital ‘to enable the 
[Borderlands] initiative to deliver on its potential’ (House of Commons 2015, np) 
and recommended for that reason that an inter-ministerial forum is set up to work 
alongside the Borderlands Initiative.  
 
The imbalance is not just in terms of political power and competences, but also in 
terms of funding. The existing rigidity of administrative boundaries – and of the 
funding that flows through them – ‘was cited by local economic development 
officers in councils close to the border as a crucial factor inhibiting increased levels 
of collaboration’ (Shaw et al. 2014, 423). England has the most centrally controlled 
system of public finance of any major OECD country: only seven per cent of all the 
taxes paid by local residents and businesses are retained by local councils (LFC 
2013). The harsh cuts imposed since 2010 by the UK government on English local 
authorities have dramatically affected their capacity for action to deliver the most 
basic statutory services, in particular in the North. So while there may be appetite for 
cross-border cooperation, there may be insufficient resources to match words with 
action. Lessons from EU-funded cooperation programmes and successful 
Euroregions show that the presence of dedicated staff acting as champions of 
cross-border cooperation, and of a small budget supporting regular calls for project 
proposals, are crucial to support the latent or actual demand for cooperation. 
 
Beyond the question of formal competences and funding, successful forms of 
trans-boundary cooperation depend, as discussed, on the capacity of actors within a 
border region to mobilize around such an endeavour. This remains a challenge in 
particular in the North-East of England, where political rivalries between 
neighbouring local authorities and within the Labour Party have often impeded 
intra-regional collaboration and mobilization. It is too early to judge whether the 
creation of the North-East Combined Authority in 2014 (which includes Durham, 
Gateshead, Newcastle upon Tyne, North Tyneside, Northumberland, South Tyneside 
and Sunderland, and will from 2017 onwards have a directly elected mayor), with 
competences in transport, economic development and regeneration, will strengthen 
the strategic capacity for the mobilization of actors from the North-East of England 
(as has happened in the Manchester city-region, often heralded as a model pupil - see 
Tomaney and McCarthy 2015). Moreover, there is a noticeable hostility on the part 
of many Labour politicians in the North-East of England towards the Scottish 
National Party, with signs of ‘a growing gap between the increasingly sympathetic 
and supportive views of North Easterners towards what’s happening in Scotland, and 
the hostile views of many North East Labour politicians (Shaw 2015, 452). The rise 
of the UK Independent Party (UKIP) in the North of England further complicates 
that picture.  
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On the other hand, in a centralised political system dominated by the interests of 
London and the South East (and in Scotland, by Edinburgh and the Central Belt, as 
feared by some Scottish actors who are wary of a ‘creeping centralization’ and 
excessive centralism in Scottish governance - McGarvey 2014; House of Commons 
2015), some Northern English actors feel that political and constitutional change in 
Scotland can actually help strengthen the claims for more regional autonomy for the 
north of England within the UK (Shaw et al. 2014). ‘A more powerful SNP group in 
Westminster could aid the North East by pushing the issue of English devolution 
further up the political agenda of the new UK Government’ (Shaw 2015, 460).12 As 
discussed above, cross-border cooperation projects involving ‘peripheral’ territories 
have often been mobilized as economic and political strategies to counteract 
dominant, centralizing national narratives  through positive place promotion and 
branding (OECD 2013), and to lobby for particular investments from central 
government. In the case of England, the Borderlands Initiative could help in better 
articulating and strengthening a ‘Northern’ voice that embraces Scotland and 
northern England (Shaw 2014) in the context of demands for more devolution and 
decentralisation in England. 
 
Interestingly enough, there are signs that the appetite for cross-border cooperation at 
the Anglo-Scottish border is helping to forge stronger relationships within England 
between the North East and Cumbria, that is, to fortify ‘east-west’ relationships as 
well as ‘north-south’ relationships (Shaw et al. 2014). That cross-border cooperation 
offers channels for better cooperation between internal partners from the same 
country which used to “turn their back to each other” is not unusual: Walloon and 
Flemish local and regional actors have often cooperated in the framework of 
INTERREG projects with actors from other European countries, while they might 
not normally have done so in the tense context of the contested Belgian Federal 
model.  
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